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Members of  the German parliament may force government to publicly answer questions by issuing 
minor interpellations (kleine Anfragen). We use 3608 interpellations from the session 2009-2013 that 
have been signed by authoring and supporting delegates to construct the social network of  support 
relations among delegates within the three opposition parties. We find that parties differ markedly in 
terms of  internal structure. While social democrats organize hierarchically, Greens cooperate horizon-
tally. The network for socialist Linke in contrast shows signs of  homophily and social segregation. Our 
approach yields a novel perspective on intra-party politics in parliamentary systems which are notori-






In politics, You are who You know. While institutions and strategy make up an essential part of  
collective organizations, personal connections are at least equally important since whatever the rules of  
the game are, it is impossible to understand outcomes without a sense of  who interacts with whom to 
produce them. In this perspective, politics is a network. Within democracies parties are the essential tie 
connecting citizens with government (and opposition). Analyses of  “making and breaking” 
(Laver/Shepsle: 1996) coalition governments have only until recently started to include intra-party 
politics in their models, relaxing the unitary actor assumption (see Giannetti/Benoit: 2009).1 Yet, 
measuring intra-party differences remains a problem, particularly in parliamentary systems such as 
Germany where strong party discipline makes it difficult to extract factions based on e.g. roll-call votes. 
The accessibility of  empirical intra-party data also hampers the analysis of  candidate selection models 
(Hazan and Rahat 2006: 117), and more generally speaking, a more profound study of  intra-party 
democracy (see Cross and Katz 2013). 
In this study we introduce social network analysis as an alternative possibility to partially open the black 
box of  the party, focusing on organizational aspects that structure intra-party politics. To do so we 
investigate the social network among members of  the opposition in the German parliament during the 
legislative term 2009–2013. We infer social connections by tracking which delegates supported other 
members' parliamentary requests for information, so called Minor Interpellations (kleine Anfragen), or 
MI for short. These interpellations are an important means of  the opposition to raise public attention, 
criticize government and try to muster public support for the next election. Since they have to be 
signed by either a parliamentary group or at least five per cent of  the members of  the Bundestag, MI 
require parliamentarians to work together. Mapping out this cooperation as an interpersonal network of  
intra-party support offers a unique window into who cooperates within the parliamentary groups, who 
is responsible for conflict with government and who plays a central role in expressing the party's 
agenda. We assume the structuring principles for the MI support network not only to determine the 
work on these interpellations, but the work within the opposition more generally. 
The question of  how parliamentarians in the opposition work together is important from at least three 
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vantage points: First, in a parliamentary system like Germany, the temporal alternation between 
government and opposition is one of  the main elements in the separation of  powers. Therefore, it is 
important to understand the opposition's internal organization, both in terms of  internal working and 
structures of  the different parties and in terms of  the cooperation between the parties on an aggregate 
level. Second, coming from an elite perspective which mainly focuses on those in power, the idea of  an 
alternation between government and opposition raises the interesting question of  who is central in this 
powerless elite framing a government in waiting. And, third, and most importantly: not much is known 
about intra-party politics in general. While intra-party differences are relevant for many subjects ranging 
from coalition formation to public policy and candidate selection, their empirical measurement is still in 
its infancy. The problem is especially salient for parliamentary systems where strong party discipline 
foils the application of  methods developed for presidential systems (such as roll call votes). One way to 
approach this dilemma is automated text analysis techniques such as Wordfish (Slapin and Proksch 
2008) or Wordscores (Laver et al. 2003). Applying the latter method to speeches of  Irish legislators and 
German MPs Laver and Benoit (2002) and Bernauer and Bräuninger (2009) analyze the ideological 
intra-party heterogeneity in Ireland and Germany respectively. Hanna Bäck presents another possibility: 
She conducted a survey asking representatives in Swedish municipalities about factionalization and 
intra-party democracy (Bäck 2008: 79-80).  
Our approach is different, as we do not focus on the ideological differences within a party (unfolded e.g. 
in speeches of  MPs) but on the way social contacts of  parliamentarians organize opposition work in 
the Bundestag and structure the internal functioning of  the parliamentary group. Such a perspective on 
intra-party organization also highlights important implications in terms of  democratic theory: While a 
party that is only loosely organized internally is probably a more friendly territory for diverging 
viewpoints, a stronger organization (especially when coupled with a hierarchical structure) would 
indicate the party’s possibility to pose a clearer alternative to voters, although at the price of  reduced 
diversity. Taking a more output-oriented perspective, the clarity of  intra-party structures could not only 
transport a party’s external appearance as a corporate entity in general but also indicate in a wider sense 
its potential to formulate and attain policy goals.  
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Our analysis is to some extent an inductive and descriptive endeavor. We want to show which 
parliamentarians work together, what the complete network of  co-signees looks like and whether 
specific patterns and structures become apparent within it. To do so, we will first justify our approach, 
outline existing work in the literature and state four preliminary hypotheses (section 2). We will then 
describe our data (3) and our method (4). After that, we will concentrate on aggregate characteristics of  
the cooperation patterns (5.1). In a second step we investigate the global opposition network derived 
from the MIs (5.2) and then focus on the structure of  the networks for each of  the three opposition 
parties separately (6.1 – 6.3). We discuss our findings in the concluding section (7). 
Theory and related work 
Why look at Minor Interpellations and What is That, anyway? 
Like in other democracies, oversight and control of  the executive are important tasks of  the German 
parliament. Among the numerous instruments the Bundestag has at its disposal is that delegates and 
parliamentary groups may force the executive to provide information and answer questions. Basically, 
there are four different ways of  inquiring2 (see Siefken 2010: 21). 
The first two possibilities are rights of  individual delegates. Every parliamentarian may either ask 
questions orally during a special weekly session or may submit written questions the answers to which 
are distributed among all members of  parliament. The two others options are minority rights which 
either five per cent of  delegates (32 persons during the term 2009–2013) or a parliamentary group may 
exercise. These are Major Interpellations (große Anfragen) and MIs (Minor Interpellations; kleine Anfragen), 
respectively. Both are submitted in written form. In the case of  Major Interpellations, the topic of  the 
inquiry and the answers from the executive (which is not obliged to reply) may be the subject of  a 
plenary debate. In the case of  MIs, no debate takes place but the provision of  an answer – which is 
available publicly – is mandatory which makes the instrument quite sharp. Also, the qualification as 
minor is rather misleading since MIs usually consist of  multiple, sometimes up to a few hundred, 
questions (Siefken 2010: 23). 
Regarding their usage MIs have seen a tremendous increase during recent years, making them a very 
interesting source of  information. During the legislative period 2009–2013 there were 54 Major and 
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3629 Minor Interpellations. This proportion stresses the relative importance of  the latter instrument. In 
the following, we will concentrate solely on these MIs and for the sake of  brevity simply refer to them 
as interpellations. 
Although conventional wisdom regarded MIs mainly as a technical means of  control and oversight (see 
Eschenburg in Siefken 2010: 27), newer work has shown that this is only part of  the story. To a 
considerable extent, delegates also use MIs as instruments of  agenda setting, to promote their standing 
in the party and to show activity to their constituency (Kepplinger 2008). In a survey conducted among 
delegates of  the opposition before and after the 2002 election, Kepplinger (2008) found that apart 
from “official” motivations for an interpellation such as raising pressure on government, “unofficial” 
reasons such as capturing media attention, gaining support from outside parliament and improving 
one's standing inside the party were among the prime motives for submitting an MI (Kepplinger 2008: 
311). The major role of  the media can also be seen from the fact that several respondents directly 
coordinated with journalists when drafting an interpellation and that a large number of  delegates always 
passed the replies they got on to media and organizations inside their constituency (Kepplinger 2008: 
313). Similarly, Patzelt cites an anonymous delegate that freely admits that MIs are not always asked to 
get an answer but rather because of  the ensuing media attention that then serves as a justification to 
both voters and those in the party in charge of  the nomination process (Patzelt 1993: 328). 
Seen from a functional perspective then, MIs can mainly be characterized as an instrument that a 
politician can actively use to raise the media's attention to a given problem, try to shape the public 
impression of  it while at the same time pointing out to his party and his constituency that he is taking 
care of  it (Kepplinger 2008: 306-309). This makes the expansion of  MIs during the last terms all the 
more understandable since they provide delegates with a document that not only testifies to their 
activity but that can also be easily passed on to those interested in the matter (Siefken 2010: 27). 
Related Work: Empirical Findings 
Generally speaking, social network analysis has proven to be well suited for bringing to light the 
structures and functioning principles of  any kind of  organizations, ranging from groups as different as 
terrorists (Krebs 2002), organized criminals (Heber 2009), publicizing scholars (Barabási 2002, 
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Newman 2001) or indeed politicians. In this latter regard we completely agree with McClurg and Lazers 
statement that “Politics is, at its core, a network phenomenon” (McClurg and Lazer 2014: 1). 
Yet, surprisingly, political science is starting only very slowly to use network analysis methods.3 This is 
especially true with regard to the legislative arena where there are only very few empirical studies on 
social networks. A pioneering strand of  literature in parliamentary studies deals with legislative cospon-
soring in the US (see Bratton and Rouse 2011, Fowler 2006a, Fowler 2006b, Kirkland 2011, Kirkland 
2013, Tam Cho and Fowler 2010, Kirkland and Gross 2014). These studies of  legislative cosponsoring 
construct networks by tracing which delegate supports another's bill, revealing social and work-related 
contacts in parliament that would otherwise be completely unobservable. Furthermore, they show that 
“institutional arrangements and strategic incentives may influence the shape of  the network” (Fowler 
2006b: 464). A different path is taken by Porter and his colleagues. They analyze mutual membership in 
committees in the House of  Representatives, e.g. pointing out close connections between committees 
and their respective subcommittees (Porter et al. 2005). Another network application for the study of  
parliamentarians comes from Victor and Ringe (2009). Their analysis of  caucuses within the House of  
Representatives shows that the most central and better connected legislators in these informal groups 
are “legislative leaders, senior members, and those who are electorally safe”. Hence, they conclude, cau-
cuses are not an alternative pathway for junior legislators to gain more influence but “a social structure 
that replicates the formal institutional organization by allowing structurally disadvantaged members to 
connect to their colleagues in formal positions of  power and influence” (Victor and Ringe 2009: 762). 
While the reported works are highly enlightening, they all deal with the US House or Senate and thus 
with the legislative branch of  a presidential system. What is lacking is a systematic analysis of  legislative 
networks within parliamentary systems. Such an analysis seems promising from several angles: First, as 
noted above, the stronger distinction between government and opposition and the resulting party disci-
pline creates a general measurement problem concerning factions that in itself  is worthwhile of  being 
addressed. Second, the system’s emphasis on corporate behavior might require different structures of  
intra-party organization, both on behalf  of  delegates and party groups. And third, interpellations are a 
very different vehicle of  cooperation compared to bill co-sponsorship in presidential systems. Their 
7 
 
association with public criticism may well rely on different features of  intra-party cooperation. In par-
liamentary systems with their clearly defined role of  the opposition as “watchdog”, the associated fea-
tures should be most clearly visible. Our analysis of  the networks defined by members of  the Bundes-
tag signing each other's MIs fills this gap, as it focuses explicitly on those who are not in power. 
Research Questions and some Preliminary Hypotheses 
Given that our approach has not been tried before, we take a mostly inductive stance and therefore 
hesitate to explicitly test hypotheses. Yet, some hints as to what we can expect can be generated from 
the literature nonetheless. While immediate theorizing on networks (e.g. Newman 2010; 
Brandes/Erlebach 2005) is mostly a mathematical endeavor and thus yields little substantial guidance, 
results from applied research in the network paradigm and knowledge about interpellations in general 
can help us to express our expectations as hypotheses: 
H1. Minor Interpellations are an Instrument of  the Opposition Parties. Since politics is increasingly 
medialized (Mazzoleni/Schulz 1999), parties out of  power must use every possibility to expose 
government failure in public, if  they want to win the next election. MIs, as all other kinds of  publicly 
visible inquiries, are a good way to do just that. Therefore, we expect by far most MIs to come from the 
opposition parties while parties in government should only rely on MIs under rare circumstances since 
they already enjoy the lion’s share of  media attention and since they have several other, more direct 
ways to communicate with the public and to set the agenda (e.g. government press conferences). Given 
the basic logic of  parliamentary systems, there should also be virtually no MIs signed by 
parliamentarians from governing and opposition parties together. Regarding the cooperation between 
opposition parties, it is less clear what to expect. On the one hand, delegates could issue common MIs 
to either foreshadow possible coalitions (or refrain from doing so in order to avoid such an impression) 
or to maximize voters' perception that their criticism is objective since it appears widely shared and 
above party quarrels. Yet, from the perspective of  public attention, working alone could also be 
beneficial: If  one can get the evening news to report about one's party and its work, it does not make 
much sense to share this attention with others. 
H2. The Support Network will partly reflect the Institutional Structure of  the Parliamentary Group. Given 
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the strong role of  institutions in the findings of  Fowler (2006a, 2006b) and Victor and Ringe (2009), we 
expect the network structure to be substantially shaped by the institutional structure within the 
parliamentary groups. To be more precise, we expect delegates who work together in a party's working 
groups – which are known to serve as backdrop for discussing MIs and seeking support (Siefken 2010: 
28) – to cooperate extensively. The reasons are simple: First, working groups define themselves 
according to specific policy areas, so parliamentarians within a working group share common interests 
and expertise. This should in turn increase mutual support for MIs. Second, we expect delegates to 
contact potential supporters in person. Thus, the mere fact of  having more personal contacts to other 
members of  a working group than to the rest of  the parliamentary group should enhance the 
possibility to find supporters within the working groups. 
H3. The Most Central Delegates in the Support Network should be Rank-and-File. Network analysis not 
only helps to see the complete structure of  a network, but also to identify central members within it. As 
parliamentarians can use MIs to gain public visibility and prove how hard they worked for the party 
goals, we expect them to improve their standing by launching a lot of  MIs. Given that not all delegates 
will have the same means of  communicating with the public and that those with a formal role inside 
the party group can more easily resort to other justifications of  their activity, we expect particularly 
those members of  the opposition from the second row – not the party elite – to launch and support 
interpellations. For the derived network this means that the most centrally located persons will probably 
be mostly rank-and-file. 
H4. Networks will show Homophily. One of the most pervasive phenomena in virtually all social 
networks is homophily (also known as assortativity), meaning that similar individuals have higher 
chances to be connected than dissimilar ones (McPherson et al. 2001). We expect delegates to be no 
exception to this rule. There are several reasons for why similar delegates might be more likely to 
support each other’s MIs. Similarity in terms of institutional position (e.g. working groups) has 
already been discussed above, but the most obvious reason is personal sympathy, derived from a 
common background or situation. In principle, homophily may exist along many different 
dimensions. We concentrate on four potentially relevant ones indicating a common social 
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background: 1) whether one entered the Bundestag through obtaining a direct vs. a list mandate, 2) 
whether one is new to parliament or not, 3) one's gender and 4) one's region of origin (West vs. East 
Germany). 
Method 
In this section, we give a short overview of  the methodological aspects necessary for our later analysis. 
For a thorough review of  network analysis, see Newman (2010), Wasserman and Faust (1994), Scott 
(2013), or Scott and Carrington (2011). 
 
FIGURE 1: Example for Our Network Structure 
 
 
A network consists of  nodes representing discrete units such as persons and (directed or undirected) 
edges standing for connections among them. While undirected edges usually represent mutual 
relationships (such as having coauthored a scientific paper together), directed edges usually indicate a 
non-mutual relation (such as one person sending an email to another). Both nodes and edges may have 
attributes (e.g. age or gender for nodes or the number of  papers written together for edges). The 
attributes for edges are often referred to as edge weights. 
In our analysis, nodes are parliamentarians and edges are support relations derived from signing onto a 
delegate's MI. To construct the network among delegates, we exploited the fact that MIs carry the name 
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of  the delegates in the standardized format “MI by delegates A, B, C, …, and the party group X.” The 
first name on an MI always denotes the initiator of  the text and all other names are supporters (Siefken 
2010: 28). This allows us to draw a directed edge from each supporter to the initiator to capture the 
underlying support relation. Since the relation is non-mutual (support need not be returned), edges are 
directed, i.e. an arrow from B to A indicates that B has signed an MI launched by A.  
In Figure 1 we have depicted a small network of  fictitious delegates that illustrates our visualization, 
containing the most relevant elements of  the networks we will be analyzing. The numbers in the nodes 
represent the numbers of  MIs launched and the numbers on the edges represent the number of  times a 
delegate has supported another one. We use the following pattern to express network information (if  
not stated otherwise).  
a) The size of  the nodes represents the number of  interpellations launched by a person. For 
example, Peter has written three MIs and Sarah has written four which can be seen by 
comparing node size.  
b) The thickness of  the edges indicates the number of  times a delegate has signed another's MIs. 
In Fig. 1 Peter has supported Sarah on three occasions making his edge to her appear thick. 
Sarah has supported Anne once so the edge between them appears thinner.  
c) The color used to fill a node represents how often a delegate has supported an MI, expressed as 
a fraction of  the number of  signatures the most supportive delegate has granted. To maintain 
visibility, the shading goes from near-black for delegates who never signed an interpellation to a 
very light grey for the delegate most actively supporting others.4 Peter is drawn in the lightest 
color since he is the most supportive node in the network. Michael, on the other hand, is drawn 
in the darkest possible shading since he has not supported any of  the fictitious delegates.  
d) Additionally, we divide the number of  times a delegate has supported another one by the 
number of  MIs written by the supported person. This value yields an impression of  how 
frequently a delegate supports another one and is used for coloring the edges. To obtain a well-
readable visualization, edges go from near-black for edges granting support on every instance to 
a very light grey for edges with minimal support. In our example Peter has supported all of  
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Michael’s interpellations so his edge is drawn in the darkest possible shading. Sarah and Anne 
have mutually supported each other once. However, the edge from Anne to Sarah is lighter 
since Anne has signed only one fourth of  Sara’s MIs while the one signature from Sara is 
equivalent to half  of  Anne’s MIs.  
It is difficult to visualize the phenomenon of  homophily in the small example plot but in principle, the 
question examined would be to test whether more edges run between for example male, female or 
mixed pairs of  delegates than would be expected by chance. 
Data 
Data Collection 
Formally, MIs need either support from five per cent of  delegates (32 individuals in the legislative 
period 2009-2013) or from one of  the party groups. In practice, all receive endorsement of  the party 
group leadership in the general phrase quoted in the preceding section but still retain a full list of  
individually mentioned supporters.5 It is this list we used for constructing the network. 
To gather the data, we downloaded digital versions of  all MIs issued during the 17th legislative term 
2009-2013 directly from the Bundestag’s website. We then used automatized text-extraction tools to 
harvest from the document header both the interpellation's individual document number and the 
names of  supporters, treating the first name in the list as author and the remaining ones as delegates 
supporting the interpellation. In a next step we used the document number to link the edges between 
authors and supporters to information concerning the content of  the interpellation (see below) which 
we gathered separately. After checking the authors' and supporters' names for correctness by comparing 
the official documents with information from the parliamentary documentation database (DIP), we 
constructed the network as described in the previous section. For delegates, we collected personal 
information as the delegate's party, gender, the state he or she was elected for, the mode of  candidacy 
(direct or list), and when he or she entered the Bundestag. For this end we used official information 
provided by the Bundestag (Feldkamp 2011). 
We also used the fact that the DIP assigns all MIs to one or more of  28 topics. This list is exhaustive 
(i.e. there are no non-categorized interpellations) but not mutually exclusive (i.e. some interpellations 
12 
 
receive more than one category). A full list of  categories is available in the appendix.  
Why would Delegates have their Name on an MI? 
At first sight, the process of  openly signing an MI appears not necessary for the parliamentary process: 
MIs with fewer than 32 supporters (five per cent of  the Bundestag) were (obviously) supported by the 
party group, rendering it unnecessary that individual delegates have their names explicitly on them. 
Indeed, the existence of  21 interpellations supported solely by the party group shows that this is not 
only in theory a viable option. In principle, delegates could also easily launch an MI without party 
leadership supporting it6, but they obviously do not take that path (presumably, because this would be 
looked upon as an open revolt): MIs with support from 32 or more individual delegates are all 
(somewhat unnecessarily) endorsed by the party group leadership, too. One way to interpret the role of  
supporters on MIs is to draw on the functional interpretation which stresses the role of  MIs as means 
to demonstrate activity and gain a foothold in one's constituency, the party, and the media. Here, 
putting one's name on an MI (or collecting someone's name, of  course) is a cheap way of  signaling 
social relations to those outside the party group (see Fowler 2006a: 458f  for a similar idea). Thus, 
having one's name together with many well-known others is a potential asset demonstrating that one is 
tightly connected inside the legislature and the party. Conversely, if  someone puts his or her name on 
an MI, he or she would probably expect the initiator to either remember the favor in the future, find his 
or her own name positively enhanced by the connection, or both.  
While this interpretation assumes that personal esteem and importance are central in the interpretation 
of  contacts, professional reasons will matter as well. For example, individuals might support 
interpellations of  delegates they closely work together with (e.g. within a working group) or whose 
experience they share. Thus, we can expect the network to be positioned somewhere between a social 
component, based on interpersonal esteem and a professional component, mainly based on expertise 
and institutional structures.  
Minor Interpellations in the Bundestag and the Opposition as a Whole 
In this section we first give an overview of  aggregate characteristics describing the cooperation patterns 
in the Bundestag that lead to MIs. For this end we focus (1) on the number of  MIs launched and signed, 
13 
 
(2) the number of  MIs concerning specific policy areas indicating the amount of  attention a party 
devotes to these topics and (3) characteristics of  the individual members of  the Bundestag who launch 
and sign interpellations. In the second part of  the section we focus on the opposition network on a 
global scale and (1) analyze support patterns and (2) test whether writing and signing MIs are jobs for 
generalists or experts in specific topics.     
Descriptive Overview 
Number of  MIs Written and Signed by Party. Our data covers 3608 MIs filed in the 17th Bundestag 
(2009–2013). Their sheer volume is rather unevenly distributed: Only 39 MIs were filed by members of  
the governing coalition of  Christian democratic CDU/CSU and liberal FDP (with members of  both 
parties always signing together). For the remainder of  the analysis we will ignore interpellations coming 
from governing parties.  
The vast majority was initiated by members of  one of  the opposition parties: 445 came from the social 
democratic SPD, 1442 from the Greens and 1682 from socialist Linke (Left Party). The skew fits our 
expectation that MIs are mainly a means of  the opposition to pester government with questions as 
Siefken (2010, 26) has also noted. However, the usage of  this instrument also varies considerably across 
parties with smaller ones much more actively relying on the instrument. We find only weak traces of  
opposition parties cooperating. Just a single interpellation (17/10187) concerning the introduction of  a 
statistic on homelessness was signed by members of  all three parties. Another three were signed by 
members of  Greens and SPD together. All four had a social democrat as initiator. All in all, working 
against government policies seems to be more of  an individual struggle for the different parliamentary 
groups than a collective undertaking.  
On average an interpellation is supported by 9.8 persons with eight supporters denoting the modal 
category. While most MIs only have relatively few individual supporters7, 36 attracted 31 or more 
supporters and a few exceed even 60 names. The MIs which attracted most supporters were issued by 
SPD and concerned reductions in expenses for bureaucracy (17/13591, 63 supporters) and the planned 
reduction of  military bases (17/8194, 61 supporters). The mean number of  supporters varies 
considerably across the party groups between 17.4 in SPD and 7.9 in Linke. However, normalized to 
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the size of  the group the disparity reduces to a rather narrow band between 10.4 per cent of  the group 
supporting an interpellation on average within Linke and 14.4 among Greens. 
Within the opposition party groups, involvement is widespread – among Greens and Linke only six 
delegates each never initiated an MI of  their own while the number is much higher for SPD where 64 
individuals never launched an interpellation themselves.8 
MIs by Topic and Attention Profiles for the Parties. The parliamentary groups differ widely in respect 
to how many of  their MIs concern a given topic. To calculate the fraction of  attention a party devotes 
to a given subject, we counted for each topic how many MIs were assigned to it. For interpellations that 
were assigned to multiple topics, we gave a score of  1/k to each of  the topics with k counting the 
number of  topics the MI was assigned to. This way, we assumed that attention within the respective 
interpellation was evenly distributed between the topics. Summing up the scores over topics for the 
different party groups (the four MIs issued by multiple groups were left out) and normalizing to unity 
per party yields figure 2 which indicates how much attention the parties devote to the fifteen topics 
most popular across the whole of  opposition. Together these make up 82.7 per cent of  the attention 
volume. 








Across the opposition, attention in terms of  MIs is unevenly distributed. Most is taken up by matters 
of  traffic (11.8 per cent). Social policy and groups (8.1 per cent), internal security (8.1 per cent) and 
environment (7.9 per cent) receive less of  total attention but still feature prominently. The least 
attention is devoted to matters of  the Bundestag (< .1 per cent) and Eastern Germany (.2 per cent). 
Comparing the different party groups to this baseline reveals that underneath the global average there is 
considerable variation: SPD devotes for example more attention to matters of  traffic, health and 
economy than the rest of  the opposition while placing less emphasis on security, international relations, 
and defense. The Greens devote their attention strongly to transportation and environment while 
holding less interest for example in matters of  internal security or social policy. The pattern for Linke is 
quite different, devoting most attention to internal security, social policy, and foreign policy and 
international relations. 
Interestingly, SPD and Greens end up ten out of  fifteen times on the same side of  the average which 
appears consistent with the parties' usual coalition preference for each other. Yet, while Greens and 
Linke are usually regarded to both locate left of  SPD suggesting that they should have substantial 
interests in common, the pattern of  interpellations gives a slightly different picture: That both parties 
never end up on the same side is in itself  not surprising since they issue the bulk of  interpellations. 
However, the differences between both parties are sometimes quite substantial such as in matters of  
environment and security which seem to make up different core topics of  the parties. 
Characteristics of  Individuals Launching and Supporting MIs. Turning to the individual level, the first 
thing to notice is that the number of  MIs a person has written is highly skewed. On average, a delegate 
issued 11.7 interpellations during the term. However, 76 delegates of  the opposition did not issue a 
single one and another 74 wrote three or less. Also, the average is somewhat inflated because of  two 
extreme outliers: During the four years observed, Ulla Jelpke (Linke) has authored a staggering 456 MIs, 
roughly one fourth of  all interpellations issued by her party group. She is followed by Sylvia Kotting-
Uhl (Greens) with 125 MIs. 
The number of  MIs supported is similarly skewed, but here the average number is at 114.8 and thus 
much higher. At the individual level, the number of  written and signed MIs is correlated considerably 
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(rp = .544, excluding Ulla Jelpke), indicating that only parts of  the party groups take center stage in the 
interpellation process. 
Given the size of  the parliamentary groups it is easy to calculate for each delegate, which fraction of  
the respective group usually signs onto his or her MIs. This measure can be regarded as a rough 
impression of  individual social support. Here, we find (for delegates with 20 or more MIs) the highest 
values for three Green parliamentarians who muster support from between one sixth and one fourth of  
their party group on average.  
The strong variation in the number of  MIs written and supported raises the question how these 
differences can be explained. To test for significant differences in average activity, we conducted Mann-
Whitney U-tests to see whether the distributions of  written and supported interpellations differed 
across the four covariates gender, candidature, region and newcomers (see table 1). 
TABLE 1: Differences in the number of  MIs (written/signed) according to covariates 
 Writing MIs Signing MIs 
Covariate Opposition SPD Greens Linke Opposition SPD Greens Linke 
Gender 
(female : male) 
15.4 : 9.0 
p = .011 
2.6 : 3.3 
n.s. 
20.4 : 20.3 
n.s. 
29.2 : 13.3 
p = .028 
131.5 : 105.5 
p = .012 
56.9 : 48.8 
n.s. 
208.1 : 179.8 
n.s. 
170.4 : 180.7 
n.s. 
Candidature 
(direct : list) 
6.8 : 14.0 
p < .001 




17.6 : 23.3 
n.s. 
86.3 : 129.4 
p = .001 
57.8 : 48.1 
p = .045 
No test 
performed* 
188.4 : 171.4 
n.s. 
Region 
(east : west) 
13.2 : 11.7 
n.s. 
2.7 : 3.0 
n.s. 
20.5 : 20.3 
n.s. 
18.2 : 25.2 
n.s. 
145.5 : 109.5 
p =.064 
74.7 : 47.9 
n.s. 
201.9 : 193.6 
n.s. 
176.7 : 173.6 
n.s. 
Experience 
(freshmen : veteran) 
11.8 : 12.2 
p = .004 
4.0 : 2.8 
n.s. 
19.6 : 20.9 
n.s. 
11.4 : 31.6 
n.s. 
154.5 :100.2 
p < .001 
60.1 : 50.2 
n.s. 
195.8 : 194.0 
n.s. 
193.5 : 158.4 
n.s. 
 
Looking at all three opposition parties together (first column) suggests that females and list candidates 
are both more likely to write and support MIs while East Germans and newcomers only support more 
whereas veteran delegates write more MIs. This finding at first sight seems to corroborate results 
indicating that cosponsoring is a means for individuals less central in the parliamentary process to pass 
their name around (see Fowler 2006a: 458), but most differences disappear once we control for party 
group: The only significant differences can be found within the Linke where women write more MIs 
than men and in SPD where direct candidates sign more MIs than their list colleagues. 
Summing up, only few parliamentarians launch a lot of  MIs, while the majority write only very few. The 
same skewed distribution describes the signatures. And, while three Green delegates are supported by 
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the largest share of  the whole party group, the party leadership of  the SPD supports most MIs.  
The Opposition Network as a Whole 
Since there are no MIs written together by members of  a governing and an opposition party, the 
network consists on a global scale of  two components. One has 306 nodes and encompasses only 
members of  the opposition parties SPD, Greens and Linke while the other component has 29 nodes 
and covers only members of  the governing parties CDU/CSU and FDP.9  
FIGURE 3: The Complete Opposition Network 
 
The opposition component consists of  three densely knit clusters (see Figure 3). Of  all possible links 
between the 306 delegates, 7.4 per cent are present which is reflected in an average number of  22.7 
connections per node (its average degree) indicating that each delegate is linked to around 23 others. 
Searching for the best connected individuals reveals that Michael Groß (SPD) has an in-degree of  135 
supporters which is nearly twice as large as runner-up Uwe Beckmeyer (SPD) who received support 
from 71 delegates. In terms of  out-degree (i.e. the number of  delegates supported), there is a group of  






group chair Frank-Walter Steinmeier and four SPD chief  whips (parlamentarische Geschäftsführer). Their 
high out-degrees of  85 or above indicate that this group plays a prominent role in the interpellation 
behavior within the SPD. 
FIGURE 4: Degree distribution (Kernel Density Estimates) 
 
Comparing the degrees across party groups, we find that SPD differs visibly from Linke and Greens 
who in turn appear rather similar (Figure 4): In the kernel density estimates for both Linke and Greens 
there is a smaller peak at low levels of  in-degree, indicating a small share of  weakly connected 
individuals. It is followed by a larger one for higher values which means that most individuals receive 
quite broad support from the party group. For SPD, the situation is somewhat reversed: Here, the 
curve for in-degree also has two distinct peaks, but the larger one is at low levels of  in-degree which 
indicates that within the network of  social democrats, we can expect to find more peripherally 
connected delegates and comparatively few parliamentarians who receive broad support from the group. 
In terms of  out-degree, the form of  the curves is much more similar, yet for Greens and Linke, the 
distributions match more strongly and among social democrats, delegates have fewer outgoing ties 
except for the small group including Frank Walter Steinmeier and the chief  whips.  
The complete network plot in Figure 3 singles out the four individuals in SPD who initiated MIs that 
were also supported by Greens and/or Linke (marked as squares). Examining individuals who 
supported the respective MIs indicates that most are regular rank-and-file members of  the group. 
Together with the observation that the topics of  the MIs seem not driven by a specific need to 
coordinate (they cover e.g. statistics on homelessness or violence in Mexico) and their small number 
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this supports the earlier conclusion that MIs are in general not a means of  cooperation among the 
opposition parties.  
Across all individuals, in-and out degree are mildly correlated (rp = .269) but much of  the relation is 
overshadowed through the high degree values of  Michael Groß and the five central SPD delegates 
around Frank Walter Steinmeier. Ignoring them for the calculation, the correlation rises to rp = .471, 
indicating that those who support many others have a strong standing in terms of  support by the group. 
Yet, this relation is not necessarily a sign of  explicit reciprocation. Rather, it may simply be a function 
of  the general activity of  some delegates. Indeed, this seems to be the case: The correlations between 
the number of  written MIs and in-degree (rp = .434) and between supported MIs and out-degree (rp 
= .772) are positive (again ignoring the six excessively connected SPD-delegates) suggesting that active 
delegates have an increased probability to pick up relationships. 
Support. Across the network, support frequencies are extremely skewed. While 44.9 per cent of  
the 6935 edges stem from a single instance of  support, another 16.4 per cent have a weight of  two. Yet, 
the maximum count is a staggering 322 instances of  support going from Jens Petermann to Ulla Jelpke 
(both Linke). On average, a delegate supports another one 5.1 times.  
How strong is cooperation among delegates? A simple way to put numbers on this question is to 
standardize the weight of  an edge to the number of  MIs that the target person has written. This way, 
we get the percentage of  times a delegate has supported another delegate he or she is tied to. Across all 
edges, support is granted on 41.0 per cent of  occasions but this value is inflated since individuals with 
e.g. a single MI are bound to have full support. Concentrating on delegates with ten or more MIs 
indicates that a delegate writing an interpellation has an average chance of  .252 of  getting support from 
a contact. Looking at the most supportive edges we find 113 with a weight of  ten or higher that 
support all of  the target's MIs. The two strongest among these edges even have a weight of  59, and 89, 
respectively. They are both between Green delegates.  
Since we know how supportive an edge is, we can try to identify individuals that receive a lot of  
support from their contacts. One way to do this is to calculate the fraction of  support instances a 
person has received as a share of  all possible ones. This can be done by taking a given delegate, 
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summing up the weights of  all incoming edges and divide the result by the product of  the number of  
MIs issued times the delegate's in-degree. Since this measure does not take into account that a person 
with a single MI must necessarily receive full support all the time, we can only interpret it for a 
sufficient number of  MIs written and compare it for people who have written the same number of  
interpellations. Comparing individuals with ten to 19 MIs to those with 20 to 29, average support drops 
quickly from 31.8 per cent of  possible instances to 25.8 per cent and remains there for higher numbers 
of  MIs indicating that with rising number of  interpellations, it gets harder to maintain a strong support 
in one's personal network. Similarly, comparing individuals with an in-degree of  20 to 29 yields average 
support of  53.5 per cent against 34.9 per cent for delegates with an in-degree of  40 to 49. Again, the 
larger one's support network is, the less probable one is to fully mobilize it all the time. 
These trade-offs can be illustrated by comparing for example Hans-Joachim Hacker (SPD, 23 MIs with 
an average of  14.7 supporters) to Katja Keul (Greens, 18 MIs, 15.0 supporters on average), two 
parliamentarians who are roughly comparable in terms of  productivity and overall support from others. 
Both illustrate two widely different strategies to gather network support (Figure 5): While Hans-
Joachim Hacker has a high in-degree of  61 together with a lower average support share (24.1 per cent), 
Katja Keul has 26 people supporting her with an average share of  57.7 per cent. The former strategy 
relies on a diverse network of  weaker contacts (i.e. contacts supporting less often) while the latter 
concentrates on a smaller number of  more strongly supportive persons. 
FIGURE 5 (left): Distribution of  edge weights (Hans-Joachim Hacker and Katja Keul)  




To sum up, we find that there are clear trade-offs between the average support a delegate gets for her 
interpellations and the number of  MIs she launches or the size of  her signee network respectively. This 
also results in two distinct strategies for gathering support: either she can try to get the signatures from 
virtually all party group members (on a MI-by-MI basis), or she can opt for a small group of  delegates 
that has already supported numerous other of  her MIs.  
Generalists and Experts. In general there could be two kinds of  working modes: generalists 
writing or signing MIs on virtually all kinds of  topics and experts who focus solely on a single matter. A 
convenient way to single out those experts is to first calculate how much attention they give to every 
single topic just as we did for the party groups above and then calculate the Herfindahl index across all 
topics. We do this for writing as well as for signing MIs. The closer the result approaches unity, the 
more a person is focused on just a single topic. However, since a delegate who writes (signs) just a 
single MI will necessarily have a Herfindahl value of  1.0, we only look at the top 50 per cent that write 
(sign) most MIs within a party group. Figure 6 shows the Kernel density estimates for these Herfindahl 
values. Three conclusions can be drawn: First, in general, parliamentarians show a more specialized 
behavior when writing MIs than when signing them. Second, while for Greens and Linke we find two 
different groups of  writing MIs – a larger one of  generalists and a smaller bunch of  experts (the peaks 
on the right of  the plot) – there is no such distinction among the SPD members. Most of  them are 
somewhere in between generalist and experts when it comes to writing interpellations. Third, turning to 
the support pattern, we find a similarity between the Greens and the SPD. Both party groups consist of  
two subgroups – a larger one signing MIs on virtually all topics (generalists) and a smaller one signing 
only on interpellations that cover specific matters. In this regard the Linke is clearly different. Their 
delegates are all generalists when it comes to supporting MIs.  
Comparison between the three Opposition Networks 
In this section we first give a focused comparative overview of  the individual opposition networks 
using network statistics, before we then take a closer look into their particular structures. Table 2 lists 
characteristics for the three networks. Comparing the parties based on these numbers it becomes 
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apparent that SPD is overall much less involved in the writing of  MIs than the Greens and the Linke. 
This point is also reflected in much lower density and degree values. While density calculates as the 
number of  edges present divided by the number of  all possible edges (connecting every node with 
every other node) the degree gives the average number of  edges connected to a node (regardless 
whether incoming our outgoing edges). On average Green and Linke delegates launched more than six 
times more MIs than SPD members. Particularly revealing in this regard is the number of  delegates 
who did not even once write a MI on their own: while there are only six such instances for both smaller 
parties there are 64 SPD delegates who never launched an interpellation. Turning to the signatures, the 
SPD delegates on average support about 50 while Greens and Linke sign more than three times as 
many MIs. This is of  course also a function of  the much smaller number of  MIs available for the social 
democrats. The average support a delegate gives to his or her fellow colleagues (calculated as the mean 
weight of  all edges) is also much smaller for the SPD while there are no major differences between 
Greens and Linke. For all three parties the underlying distribution of  this support is highly skewed.  
We may also ask how strongly delegates work as teams, each supporting the MIs written by the other (= 
reciprocity). Looking at the fraction of  edges which are reciprocated, we find the highest reciprocity for 
the Greens and the Linke, indicating a much stronger horizontal organization in these two parties than 
in the SPD.  
TABLE 2: Characteristics of  the three opposition networks 
 SPD Greens Linke 
MIs 445 1442 1682 
Nodes 154 75 77 
Density (percentage of  all possible edges present) 10.9 39.4 36.3 
Degree 16.7 29.2 27.6 
Written MIs ∅ 
   Min (number of  delegates)  










Supported MIs ∅ 
   Min (number of  delegates)  










Average support (∅ weight of  the edges) 3.0 6.4 6.3 
Reciprocity  24.9 60.8 54.7 
 
The following three sections we will analyze the networks within each party group. Since these 
networks are very dense, we will not plot edges with a weight of  less than four to enhance readability 
(i.e. an edge is drawn only when a delegate supported another on average once a year). However, all 
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statistics reported and all information (i.e. node size, coloring etc.) in the plots is derived from the full 
networks. 
The SPD Network 
Structure of  the SPD Network. The network of  the SPD party group consists of  154 nodes and 
has a strongly star-like structure with three different types of  nodes clearly standing out; these nodes 
come to rest in concentric circles in Figure 7 (at the level of  filtering for the plot, 29 delegates do not 
appear at all because they are so loosely tied to others that they become isolates when lightweight edges 
are discarded). An outer circle contains 64 delegates with only outgoing edges. These delegates have 
never drafted an interpellation themselves but only supported others. 
In the dead center of  the graph there is a small cluster of  five nodes with mostly outgoing edges 
(circles in light grey). These delegates are the already mentioned group of  party chair Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier and four of  the five party whips who signed in varying combinations on all party group MIs. 
The fifth whip is absent from the center and – since he has supported just six MIs – seems to have a 
different field of  activity. Given that all central members in the network are in the group’s leadership, 
the star-like structure is most likely a function of  the group’s organization although it is unclear 
whether leadership either endorses all outgoing MIs or whether only those are issued which have found 
the leaderships consent. The latter interpretation would be quite in line with Robert Michels “Iron Law 
of  Oligarchy” (1911) and fit the observation that the SPD party group underwent a strong increase in 
centralized control during the SPD-Greens coalition government formed in 1998 under Chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder. This centralization was mainly driven by then-chairman Franz Müntefering who was 
heavily criticized by pundits for turning the party into a machine at the disposal of  government.10 Yet, 
centralization in terms of  MIs does not extend to the whole party elite since group’s vice chairs are not 
involved in this specific aspect of  party activity – their average writing and supporting activity is below 




FIGURE 7: The SPD network 
 
Size of  nodes: number of  MIs launched. Thickness of  edges: number of  times a delegate has signed another’s MIs. Color 
of  nodes: number of  MIs supported by a delegate (the darker the more). Color of  edges: stability of  support-relationship 
(the darker the more stable). 
Traffic Defense Health 
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The third group of  nodes, located in the plot in the middle concentric circle is responsible for the bulk 
of  SPD interpellations. These parliamentarians receive support from both directions: on the one hand 
from the party group leadership and on the other hand from the nodes at the edge. Selecting all 90 
nodes with a non-zero in-degree, we find that 43 of  them either were speaker or vice-speaker of  a 
working group in the party (or both) and that their average number of  MIs launched lies at 6.5 
(compared to 3.5 for the remaining 47 delegates). This suggests that their activity is related to their 
working-group membership. Indeed, the role of  the working groups can be seen by shading edges 
according to the extent they focus on a single topic (see the smaller plots in Figure 6 for the matters of  
traffic, health, and defense; the darker the shading, the more an edge deals with the respective topic). 
All three plots clearly single out the respective working groups, e.g. “Traffic, construction, and urban 
development” which appear as a tightly interlinked cluster in the lower right quadrant of  the plot and 
which – judging from edge weights – is one of  the most active groups in the SPD.11 We have only 
plotted three exemplary topics, but for virtually all DIP-categories the same pattern appears that only a 
small number of  the stronger edges is concerned with the topic. These edges usually cluster in a single 
region of  the network and most often all point towards one or at most very few delegates that seem to 
take care of  the matter on behalf  of  the party group while the rest of  the network stays inactive. In 
some cases working group chairs (square nodes) occupy these central positions (e.g. Rainer Arnold for 
“defense”), in other cases they are more remote like Karl Lauterbach, the chair of  the working group 
“health”, letting one of  the working group’s backbenchers organize the interpellation business.  
Homophily in the SPD Network. So far we have found the structure of  working groups to be very 
important for the SPD network. Can we isolate other structural properties? To determine whether the 
network might be driven by homophily, we counted the number of  edges going within and between the 
groups of  our covariates (gender, region of  origin, direct/list candidates, and freshmen/veterans) and 
ran permutation12 tests to determine whether edges show significant homophily in terms of  a given 
attribute. These tests proceed by comparing the observed edge distribution between two or more 
classes of  nodes (e.g. between all female parliamentarians) to a null model in which characteristics and 
structure are independent.13 Testing for our four covariates turned up no significant tendencies of  
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homophily. It seems, that for the social democrats, the main determinant of  its network structure are 
the institutional patterns of  the working groups and party leadership, giving the network a vertical and 
task-related structure, whereas horizontal elements based on social alikeness are less relevant.  
The Greens’ Network 
Structure of  the Greens’ Network. The Greens' network (Figure 8) is again highly structured but not 
in the star shaped, centralized way that we observed for SPD. From a bird's eye view the network of  75 
nodes appears instead more horizontally organized, consisting of  five densely knit regions, two of  
which are smaller and less interconnected than the others. Between the regions are a few individuals 
which are tied to multiple of  the clusters. Overall, the Greens' network is the densest one and the one 
with the highest degree.  
Looking at the role of  formal leadership indicates that higher ranked delegates seem not to be as 
heavily involved in coordinating the writing of  MIs as in the SPD. Both group chairs, Jürgen Trittin and 
Renate Künast, are marginalized, having never issued an interpellation themselves and only supported 
one and six interpellations, respectively. Of  the two party chairs, only Claudia Roth captured a seat in 
the Bundestag. She is somewhat more enmeshed with an in-degree of  20 and an out-degree of  31 – yet, 
her position is based mainly on her active role as a supporter (she signed 233 MIs and issued only four). 
Similarly, the party whips seem to be in principle involved in writing MIs, but they are located mainly in 
the two dense clusters on the right and thus far from the central role they play among social democrats 
when it comes to signatures. Looking at the working groups, however, we find that each of  the five 
working group chairs locates in one of  the clusters – although they are not strongly set apart from the 
other members in terms of  degree, publications, and support – suggesting that the working groups play 





FIGURE 8: The Greens’ network 
Size of  nodes: number of  MIs launched. Thickness of  edges: number of  times a delegate has signed another’s MIs. Color 
of  nodes: number of  MIs supported by a delegate (the darker the more). Color of  edges: stability of  support-relationship 
(the darker the more stable). 
Economy, Labor, Social, Finance… Environment, Energy, Traffic…  Foreign Policy, Defense, Europe… 
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In order to validate the idea that the clusters are indeed working groups we aggregated the topics across 
edges to mirror the fields of  expertise of  the Greens’ five working groups and plotted them separately 
(see Fig. 8, small insets). The very consistent results, strongly separating out topic- and thus working-
group-based sub-clusters, confirm that working groups are indeed the basic organizing principle of  the 
network. Thus, while the Greens rely on working groups too for structuring their interpellation process, 
they do not follow the SPD in terms of  hierarchical active coordination through the whips. Greens use 
a decentralized but in terms of  output obviously no less effective means of  control which in addition 
also supports the specialization within the party group.14 
Looking at the best connected individuals among Greens we find that most of  the delegates high in 
both in- and out-degree do not play an official role in the party group hierarchy. In terms of  
specialization, we find that the top five specialists from the Greens spend around 80 per cent of  their 
MI mass on a single topic. Of  these, Anton Hofreiter who succeeded Jürgen Trittin in October 2013 as 
party group chair, is clearly most prominent as three of  the most focused support relations also target 
him. Since he has been chair of  the Bundestag committee on traffic, construction, and urban 
development since 2011, it is hardly surprising that this reflects in his field of  expertise. 
Homophily in the Greens’ Network. As for the SPD, there are no significant signs of  homophily or 
other groups preferences in the number of  ties between groups. For all three covariates (we did not test 
for mode of  candidacy since all but one delegate are list candidates) we did not find significant 
tendencies to form edges to nodes from the same class. Indeed, except for possibly a slight tendency of  
East German delegates to form fewer edges to West German delegates (198 observed vs. 256.5 
expected edges; the border of  the 5%-significance interval was estimated at 185.0), all observed values 
remained fairly close to the simulated averages, indicating that the network is only marginally dominated 




The Linke Network 
Structure of  the Linke Network. Already from a global perspective, the network within Linke 
differs visibly from the two party networks we have examined so far (Figure 9). It consists of  77 nodes 
and is again denser than the SPD network. In terms of  in-degree one delegate stands out: Ulla Jelpke 
has been supported by 71 different delegates meaning that she connects to 92.2 per cent of  her party 
group. On the other hand, the number of  delegates with no incoming links is again much lower than 
for the SPD which nicely illustrates that among the Linke (like before among the Greens), delegates are 
in general more involved in drafting MIs resulting in a very small periphery of  support-only nodes.  
For the plot we again drop edges with less than four signatures. The network of  the Linke lacks both 
the star-like structure of  the SPD and the visible clustering of  the Greens. Instead, the only visible 
patterns are (except for Ulla Jelpke who is connected to almost every person) two regions of  higher 
density in the upper and lower left quadrants of  figure 9. Its degree assortativity of  near-zero (r = -.064) 
indicates that the network lacks a vertical organization – neither do well-connected nodes prefer each 
other (= positive assortativity), nor do they mainly connect to peripheral nodes (= negative 
assortativity). Also, edges are more often reciprocated than within the SPD indicating a strong 
horizontal organization but not as strong as for the Greens (see table 2). 
Searching for formal party group organization roles indicates only very few evidence that the network 
is driven by institutional party leadership. Party group chair Gregor Gysi is a rather isolated node in 
terms of  the interpellation process and of  the seven party group vice chairs, only two are above the 
average in terms of  in-degree (three have no incoming links at all). In terms of  out-degree, only three 
are connected to more delegates than average. Party whips are a bit more active, but still they definitely 
do not come close to their SPD counterparts. Taking a final look at the working group chairs (square 
nodes) qualifies this picture only slightly: In terms of  incoming and outgoing edges as well as written 
and signed MIs at least five out of  the seven working group chairs are above the average Linke delegate, 
but they stand out less clearly than some of  the very central working group chairs within the SPD 
network. Insofar, while the institutional role most clearly involved in the interpellation process appears 
to be working group chairs for the Linke as well, their role is more taken back. In summary, one can say 
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that the party group leadership and the whips in the Linke do not remain outside the process of  
drafting interpellations, but they are not overly involved, either: leadership is not as visibly involved in 
writing and signing interpellations as among social democrats or Greens. 
Looking at the individuals with highest specialization among those with 20 or more interpellations, we 
find that they are again relatively strongly focused with the most specialized delegates devoting around 
80 per cent of  their attention to a single topic. Yet, while on the individual level some parliamentarians 
strongly concentrate on a certain topic, it is more difficult to isolate the working groups or other 
thematically oriented clusters in the Linke network than it is for SPD and Greens. Matching the topics 
of  the seven working groups to the classification of  the DIP system indeed singles out regions in the 
graph in which edges mainly deal with the given subject area. Yet, these regions heavily bleed into one 
another15, suggesting that support for MIs within the Linke does not stop at the institutional 
boundaries of  the working groups. However, structure in terms of  topics is not completely absent 
from the graph. If  we aggregate topics into three broad classes, reflecting (1) work, health and social 
security, (2) matters of  economy and environment, and (3) matters of  international politics and security, 
we get a relatively good separation of  areas in the network connected through the common interest in a 
subject area (see small insets in Figure 9) that cover 39.9 per cent, 17.7 per cent, and 35.5 per cent of  
the attention expressed in interpellations. It appears, that much of  the attention the party signals in 
terms of  minor interpellations follows this broad threefold classification that only partly can be fitted 
to the institutional working group structure. Yet, these three sub-groups are much more loosely knit 




FIGURE 9: The Linke network 
Size of  nodes: number of  MIs launched. Thickness of  edges: number of  times a delegate has signed another’s MIs. Color 
of  nodes: number of  MIs supported by a delegate (the darker the more). Color of  edges: stability of  support-relationship 
(the darker the more stable). 
Work, Health, Social Security Economy and Environment International Politics and Security 
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Homophily in the Linke Network. Some of  the difficulties in recovering the formal working group 
structure within the Linke might also be explained in terms of  homophily. Here, the Linke network is 
more revealing than connections among social democrats and Greens. While assortativity coefficients 
for our covariates remain at or below an absolute value of  0.1, the permutation tests (see Figure 10) 
indicate that within Linke, East German delegates have more edges among each other than might be 
expected by chance (511 vs. 406.8). Also, the observed number of  edges between the groups seems to 
suggest that both East and West Germans may not have a strong preference for each other, although 
the results fall short of  significance. Given that the Linke was formed from two separate parties less 
than a decade ago, one being the follow up party of  the GDRs Socialist Unity Party mainly based in 
Eastern Germany (PDS) and one being a catch basin for leftists and trade unionists that was mainly 
based in Western Germany (WASG), this difference is not surprising. 
FIGURE 10: Homophily in the Linke network 
 
A different pattern emerges for freshmen for which we observe more edges to veteran delegates than 
the null model suggests (619 vs. 535.1). Also, veterans record fewer edges towards delegates new to the 
Bundestag than we would expect if  the attribute was randomly scattered across the network (457 vs. 
535.3). For the mode of  candidature (list vs. direct), no comparable findings emerge. Here, the number 
of  edges between, and within different groups are quite close to what one would expect from a random 
distribution across the network. The largest deviation from the null model can be observed for gender. 
Female delegates have considerably more edges among each other than would be expected from a 
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random distribution of  attributes across the network (803 vs. 624.1). Conversely, male delegates have 
fewer edges among themselves suggesting a lower cohesiveness as a group (329 vs. 432.1). While the 
observed number of  male to female edges does not depart significantly from a model of  no association 
suggesting an average degree of  support, women seem more reluctant to support men as they have 
significantly fewer edges to the other gender than we would expect by chance (435 vs.533.2). We cannot 
decide from our data but expect this difference to stem from the party group's unique institutional 
feature of  a separate female-only assembly that was created in 2012 to explicitly foster female-only 
networks and that is officially allowed to veto any plenary decision taken by the parliamentary group. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Our study is the first to use minor interpellations and network analysis as means to look into the 
internal organization of  opposition parties in a parliamentary system. We have done so for the German 
parliament in the 17th legislative period between 2009 and 2013. Wrapping up, what have we gained 
from it? Our answer can be given at several levels. 
At a substantial level, we have found support for H1: Interpellations are indeed an instrument of  the 
opposition. More broadly, however, we have found that for intra-party cooperation, politics is, indeed, a 
network, at least for delegates. While party groups rarely cooperate, individuals within a party 
extensively support each other in preparing and launching public criticism of  government. While not all 
share the work alike, the large majority of  delegates at one point or another launches an interpellation 
or at the least grants support which fits the idea of  control and oversight as a collective undertaking. 
Yet, the strong skews in activity and contacts also shows that each party has a group of  delegates that is 
mostly organizing the interpellation business while the rest appears more like second-row supporters. 
Contacts among delegates are in general not particularly strong, yet a substantial number of  edges 
clearly indicated strong and stable cooperation. Also, reciprocation among delegates is also a common 
feature. Naturally, such findings warrant the expectation that individuals connected by strong edges 
might have an underlying personal connection as well. Furthermore, delegates varied considerably in 
the way their personal support networks were constructed. While some have weak but broad 
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connections, others are embedded in fewer but stronger relations. For H3, observations on the 
positions of  delegates yielded only partial support. Often, the most central members of  the network 
were indeed rank-and-file, yet party leadership did play a substantial role among social democrats and in 
part with Greens. 
At a structural level, we have found that support networks differ strongly across party groups. In line 
with observations from presidential systems, and supportive of  H2, we found that contacts between 
delegates generally evolve around institutional features, in our case working groups. Yet, within this 
general principle, parties have organized their internal structure quite differently. Social democrats 
strongly rely on working groups (often with a single delegate taking care of  asking the questions) which 
suggests a substantial division of  labor. At the same time, the star-shaped network has a hierarchical 
cast since group leadership actively endorses (and thus explicitly connects its own weight to) outgoing 
interpellations. For the Greens working groups feature prominently, too. Yet, they form a decentralized 
system of  internally cohesive units and the role of  group leadership is more taken back (although this 
obviously does not mean that they play no role regarding interpellations). The networks in both parties 
thus convey the impression of  well-organized and effective actors. For Linke, the impression is less 
clear-cut: Working groups (or to be more precise, clusters of  delegates connected by the same focus of  
interest) are present as well but appear to be a weaker organizing force. Instead, personal characteristics 
of  delegates begin to explain network structure. The difference observed here might relate back to the 
party’s history (concerning eastern and western delegates) but they could also stem from specific 
institutional structures in the party (in the case of  female-only-networks). Thus, H4 received some 
support but only for  Linke. Summing up, the SPD and the Green networks both show a well-
organized structure: hierarchical for SPD and more decentralized for the Greens. The Linke network is 
something else. On the one hand it lacks a clear structuring principle, on the other hand it is the only 
network that shows signs of  homophily, indicating that personal characteristics of  the parliamentarians 
play a larger role in explain the Linke interpellation network.  
At a methodological level, we have found that we can indeed use interpellations and social network 
analysis to expose intra-party politics. Our approach of  deriving a stable network from observing a 
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large mass of  transitory instances of  support is analogous to looking down from a mountain at night, 
trying to figure out where the roads in a valley lie by following the headlights of  the cars that drive on 
them. Obviously, finding the roads works in our analysis and the map we obtained outlines to a large 
extent the institutional features of  party groups. Beyond our present study, this indicates quite some 
potential for research on intra-party politics, given that our approach can easily be extended to any 
document format that can be interpreted as a support relation. While already some information can be 
extracted from the present “road map”, it does not yet contain clear indication of  intra-party factions. 
However, the relevance of  socio-structural characteristics for the structure of  the Linke network 
suggests that it contains more information than we have been able to extract here. To extend the 
analogy: Since we now know where the roads lie (and where there are none, of  course), we can go on 
to look for the volume of  traffic and make of  cars that go along it and try to infer from it something 
about the relation between the places they connect. Since our study is mostly exploratory and inductive, 
such an analysis goes beyond its scope, yet we have laid down a first stepping stone for such work. 
Our results are certainly encouraging, yet one must not forget the limitations of  our approach. One 
major drawback of  interpellations as data is that they are virtually absent for governing parties which 
blinds us to their internal organization. A second drawback is that we only observe interpellations that 
have found the consent of  leadership and miss those attempts to launch an interpellation that did not 
make it. Again, this is not what one would wish for, but methodologically, the problem is nothing new 
since we also mostly hear speeches that were given, read press communications that were made and 
learn of  laws that were proposed. 
Where can we go from here? Our study only looks at opposition parties, covers a single legislative 
period and our assessment of  homophily is very crude. Subsequent work could try to improve on these 
points. Also, it might be worthwhile to trace the development of  a network across several parliamentary 
sessions to see whether and how legislators’ networks shift over time. Another option is to compare 
two networks before and after a party was in government to see how the internal structure is affected. 
An especially telling case might be to compare the current structure of  social democrats to that from 
before 1998 when Gerhard Schröder became chancellor. Regarding intra-party politics, research could 
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try to connect wordscoring techniques and network analysis to see how much the structures we 
uncovered reflect delegates’ ideological positions. For all these questions the present study may pose a 




                                                 
We thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and especially reviewer two for 
bringing to our attention the applicability of  our work for the field of  intra-party politics in general. 
1  Policy studies have remained even more reluctant to use intra-party differences. Partisan theory 
has since its beginnings largely rested on measuring ideological positions of  parties which it regarded as 
unitary actors (e.g. Castles and McKinley 1979Häusermann et al. 2014). A notable exception is an 
article by Marx and Schumacher, who explain the choice for neoliberal policies within social democratic 
governments in Spain and Germany by „intra-party conflict between office-motivated leaders and 
policy-motivated activists“ (Marx and Schumacher 2013: 152).  
2 All modes are laid down in the rules of procedure (Geschäftsordung des Deutschen Bundestages, 
GOBT) which can be found in an English translation at: https://www.btg-
bestellservice.de/pdf/80060000.pdf 
3  See Siegel (2011) for a review of network approaches within Comparative Politics and Hafner-
Burton et al. (2009) for applications within International Relations.   
4 In some figures below we use the content of an edge to illustrate how individuals working on 
the same topic cluster in the network. In these cases, we have removed edges without any relevant 
content entirely from the visualization to enhance interpretation.  
5  Just 21 MIs had only been signed by an entire parliamentary group (all by SPD) and not by any 
single individual(s). Those MIs will not be used in the following network analysis. 
6  At the beginning of the 17th legislature there were 239 parliamentarians member of the 
CDU/CSU, 146 SPD, 68 Greens, 76 Left party and 93 FDP members. All parliamentary groups 
therefore had the necessary number to sponsor an MI on their own without support from other parties. 
7  There was even one interpellation issued by Manuel Sarrazin (Greens) concerning the EU 
budget that did not find a single individual supporter (17/14045). 
8  These figures include delegates that left parliament or died before the end of the legislative 
term. 
9  The government component is rather small and has a perfect star-like structure. It consists of  
delegates from both CDU/CSU and FDP and came into being through a sequence of  39 MIs issued 
37 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
monthly by the same member, asking for statistics on political crimes. It describes a single-focus group 
in which most (but not all) members support all of  the MIs. Due to its very simple structure, it seems 
of  little interest and is ignored in the following. 
10  Kurt Kister, “Überraschungen im Leben eines Berechenbaren,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 16 January, 
2010. Heribert Prantl, “Schröders Leibeigene,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 1 October, 2003. 
11  The two other square nodes in this cluster next to Uwe Beckmayer are his successor as chair 
for the working group on traffic and the working group chair for tourism. This shows that working 
groups linked in substance cooperate when it comes to MIs. 
12  See Christakis and Fowler 2013, 559. 
13  To derive the null model, we first randomly permute the distribution of the node attribute of 
interest while holding the network structure constant. We then count the number of edges between and 
among the different types of nodes and record them. This is repeated over and over until the 
distribution for the independent situation is sufficiently approximated (in our case 5000 times). The 
mean over all simulated values of the statistic yields the expected number of edges under independence. 
Taking the .025 and .975 percentile, we can also assess whether the observed values significantly depart 
from those generated by the null model. Note, that these tests are relatively simple and cannot control 
for other, possibly confounding variables or interactions so the results have to be interpreted with care. 
14  Indeed, a personal contact to a person working for a Greens delegate confirmed that within at 
least one working group there exists a form explicitly probing whether an MI was coordinated with the 
speaker of the working group concerned with the topic. Many thanks to the person who provided this 
piece of information. 
15  E.g. if one removes all edges that do not deal with a topic falling into the realm of the first 
working group (“Budget, East Germany, Urban Development, Agriculture & Consumer Protection, 
Petitions, Traffic and Municipal Policy, Tourism & Sport”), this yields a sub-network consisting of all 
but two of the delegates from the complete party group network. This means that, although some of 
the remaining edges concentrate in one region of the graph, this clustering is not very strong since 
virtually the complete parliamentary group is in the end involved in launching and signing 
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Work and employment Arbeit und Beschäftigung 269 189.2 38 24.7 75 52.8 156 111.7 
Foreigners and immigration Ausländerpolitik, Zuwanderung 200 148.9 2 1.5 39 27.3 159 120.1 
Foreign policy and international relations Außenpolitik und internationale Beziehungen 402 216.8 18 9.4 130 66.6 254 140.8 
Foreign economic relations Außenwirtschaft 87 40.8 6 2.5 38 16.5 43 21.8 
Education Bildung und Erziehung 98 63.8 34 21.5 31 22.7 33 19.7 
Bundestag Bundestag 6 2.5 0 0 5 2.0 1 0.5 
Energy Energie 246 130.4 19 10.6 195 104.5 32 15.3 
Development policy Entwicklungspolitik 80 50.5 3 2.0 45 28.0 32 20.5 
European policy and European Union Europapolitik und Europäische Union 173 79.8 13 6.3 63 30.2 97 43.3 
Social policy and groups Gesellschaftspolitik, soziale Gruppen 469 287.6 57 41.0 96 61.8 316 184.7 
Health Gesundheit 269 200.2 42 29.2 116 87.3 111 83.7 
Internal security Innere Sicherheit 486 287.0 13 10.0 50 30.7 423 246.3 
Culture Kultur 45 29.2 10 7.3 14 9.8 21 12.0 
Agriculture and food Landwirtschaft und Ernährung 160 112.1 22 16.6 96 63.7 42 31.7 
Media, communication, and information 
technology 
Medien, Kommunikation und 
Informationstechnik 
124 66.9 21 11.8 24 12.3 79 42.8 
Eastern Germany Neue Bundesländer 16 8.3 2 1.0 2 1.0 12 6.3 
Public finance and taxation Öffentliche Finanzen, Steuern und Abgaben 199 106.6 16 7.8 83 46.0 100 52.7 
Political life and parties Politisches Leben, Parteien 24 15.8 4 2.5 4 2.3 16 11.0 
Spatial planning, construction, and housing Raumordnung, Bau- und Wohnungswesen 101 62.8 21 13.4 55 32.2 25 17.2 
Law Recht 274 129.1 23 10.8 93 45.7 158 72.6 
Social security Soziale Sicherung 144 98.5 15 10.2 37 22.8 92 65.5 
Sport, recreation, and tourism Sport, Freizeit und Tourismus 62 43.1 20 13.8 21 14.4 21 14.8 
State and administration Staat und Verwaltung 139 81.3 15 7.7 61 34.7 63 39.0 
Environment Umwelt 458 282.2 29 17.8 341 209.1 88 55.2 
Traffic Verkehr 494 421.3 115 97.6 302 263.1 77 60.7 
Defense Verteidigung 258 168.6 9 5.3 64 38.2 185 125.1 
Economy Wirtschaft 304 168.2 46 28.4 164 91.1 94 48.7 
Science, research, and technology Wissenschaft, Forschung und Technologie 126 73.2 43 30.2 46 25.0 37 18.1 
All numbers reported exclude four minor interpellations launched by SPD but supported by members of  other opposition parties. 
 
